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DEFINING CUTTING EDGE SCHOLARSHIP: FEMINISM
AND CRITERIA OF RATIONALITY
NANCY LEVIT*

All too often, attempts to define or evaluate good scholarship
tend toward the development of criteria of meritocracy that reinforce
existing hierarchies. Some of the efforts to identify quality scholarship
are quantitative. They may involve cataloguing the top articles in
terms of popularity as measured by overall citation rates,1 ranking law
reviews by citation counts, 2 or classifying articles on a "greatest hits"
list. 3 Or they may be tabulations toward a different purpose: counting citations to construct a list of articles most-often-cited in fancy
publications to create a hierarchical ordering of faculty productivity. 4
Other efforts to describe quality scholarship involve the construction of criteria of merit, often for purposes of pronouncing what sorts
of scholarship qualify for tenure, and sometimes for disqualifying certain types of scholarship-particularly nontraditional ideas and forms
of writing-as worthy. 5 The concern, in short, has been too much with
the mechanics, numbers, and creditworthiness of scholarship and too
little with its foundational qualities.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. I am
grateful to David Achtenberg, Robert Chang, Bob Downs, Bob Hayman, Marty Levit, Doug
Linder, Ed Richards, Ellen Suni, and Rob Verchick for commenting helpfully upon earlier drafts
of this article. I particularly wish to thank Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado for their thoughtful substantive suggestions. I also want to thank the UMKC Law Foundation for its financial
support in the form of a summer research grant.
1. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 751 (1996) [hereinafter Shapiro, Articles Revisited]; Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Articles from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449 (1991); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Law Review Articles, 73 CAL L. REV. 1540 (1985).
2. See Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals,1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
227, 234-40.
3. See, e.g., GREAT AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS (Robert C. Berring ed., 1984).
4. See, e.g., Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty
Scholarship Survey, 70 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1445 (1995); Ira M. Ellman, A Comparison of Law
Faculty Productionin Leading Law Reviews, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 681 (1983); Michael I. Swygert
& Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: Comparisons of Law School
Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDuC. 373 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). See also Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts in Judgments on Promotion, Tenure, and Status, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (1993); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Delgado. The Imperial Scholar].
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In this essay, I explore some defining characteristic traits or
properties of jurisprudential scholarship that has been pathbreaking.
The purpose of the exploration is to elucidate what ways of thinking
and writing are cutting edge-what puts a topic on the edge, so to
speak. Drawing significantly on modern critical theories, particularly
feminist legal theory, and on historically developing criteria of rationality, I sketch the features that characterize promising work in legal
theory.
I suggest that conventional criteria of theory-acceptance misguidedly center on measures of popularity. This essay proposes that
theory-acceptance in law be evaluated instead by the criteria of rationality, which include criteria of the scientific method and theory
development. The argument is that good scholarship may or may not
be popular, but it will be theoretically sound. The essay then looks
through the lens of these criteria at feminist legal scholarship, demonstrating how much of feminist legal theory, in comporting with these
criteria, has been at the cutting edge of theoretically solid innovation
in jurisprudence. Finally, it urges scholars to generate a new discussion regarding the criteria of theory-acceptance toward the end of creating innovative sparks that lead to better theory-building.
I.

FOUNDATIONAL VERSUS QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The centerpieces of this Symposium focus on the possibilities of
quantitative methods of determining the popularity of articles or the
productivity of faculty members. It may be argued that citation
counts are one measure of the impact of legal theorizing. The argument might be that cutting edge topics are the kind that generate discussion-they are the sorts of issues that keep scholars talking. And
the citation practices of courts may give some insights into the practical influence of theory. 6 Quantitative approaches can also yield some
useful information about the race and gender composition of referen7
tial authority.
Fred Shapiro's data regarding citation counts for recent articles
show significant representations of outsiders,8 so significant in fact
6. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the
Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986).
7. See James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties,

71 Cm.-KErr L. REv. 781, 804 (1996).
8. Shapiro, Articles Revisited, supra note 1, at 758.

If we combine women and minority scholars into one demographic "outsider" category,
we find that 39 of 103 articles in the latest ten-year period and 28 of 51-a majority-in
the latest five years are "outsiders" in this sense. The minority majority reaches an
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that he concludes that "outsiders in this period have achieved some
kind of insider status in the law reviews, if not outright dominance." 9
Shapiro also estimates that for the latest five years of his study
(1987-91), most of the most-heavily-cited articles are "'outsider' in
their politics" (presumably written from the perspective of or concerning issues of feminism, critical race theory, and critical legal studies).1 °
Professor James Lindgren's and Daniel Seltzer's data show that women and racial minorities are breaking into the top law reviews in
numbers roughly commensurate with their presence in the profession,
although they note that women are underrepresented in the top
twenty-five "most-prolific" positions." 1 Apart from the last part, this is
encouraging news, but should be received with some skepticism.
Reliance on quantitative assessments of legal scholarship may
tend to subtly perpetuate existing hierarchies of race, gender, and theory prominence, while telling little about the substantive or foundational qualities of a theory. Citation analysis has its empirical
limitations. It possesses certain self-legitimating qualities, which call
into question the significance of citations. Do heavy-hitters in the citation count have inflated batting averages because of obligatory citation practices to the most conspicuous works in an area? Conversely,
is the influence of rookie authors underestimated because some writers may not mention background works on which they relied? 12 Are
some articles completely omitted from the citation count because they
were not selected in the first place to have their citations counted? 13
Does selecting the X number of top articles in a field or citation count
tend to focus attention on an elite group of articles or authors to the
astonishing level if only the top five of each year from 1987 to 1991 is tabulated. Seventeen of 26 top-ranking articles from these five years are outsider-authored. The number
goes to 19 of 26 if openly gay scholars are added in to the demographic outsider
definition.
Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 7, at 804.
12. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., Partnersin a Process: The Academy and the Courts, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1980).
13. Fred Shapiro details his careful (and seemingly exhausting, even if not completely exhaustive) methodology in an Appendix to his article. Articles Revisited, supra note 1, at 778. He
should be complimented on his efforts to move toward an examination of the interdisciplinary
impact of materials. Yet it is important to note that his choice of which articles to check was
determined by looking at lists of citations from Shepards and from an interdisciplinary source,
listing citation to articles appearing in "21 key" law reviews. In other words, might an article be
out of the running before the tabulation starts if it has a wide interdisciplinary impact but does
not appear in a sufficiently prestigious journal to begin with?
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exclusion of a diverse and productive (although not with individual
"greatest hits" in "most-cited" reviews) second string?
There are, of course, other issues that quantitative analysis cannot reach. Are certain articles published or cited because of "the
jargon factor" 14 (because they use hot jurisprudential terminology) or
the cute factor (say, a memorable title)? Does an article rocket in a
later citation count because of its prominence in an earlier one (quantitative success breeding quantitative success)? Of course, none of
these questions concerning possible shortcomings of numeric modes
of analysis addresses the methods by which, in the first place, articles
are selected for publication or authors are invited to write for a particular symposium. 15 At bottom, these are not methodological quibbles
intended to strike at the statistical soundness of citation counting
methods, but deeper questions directed at the ways in which pre-existing social and political biases subtly influence these quantitative
methods of assessment and their perception and use.
There is also a political backdrop to quantitative analysis, which
will not be illuminated by any measures of citations or productivity.
Do citation counts or measures of faculty productivity accurately portray the reception of outsider scholars, their scholarship, or their theories? Are women and racial minorities also moving up occupational
ladders? The data suggest that outsiders are not being promoted or
tenured at rates commensurate with their presence in the profession
or the population. 16 No matter what outsiders do in the way of heroic

14. I am indebted to Professor Ellen Suni for this point.
15. See Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium: A Hard Party To Crashfor Crits,Feminists, and Other Outsiders, 71 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 989, 998 (1996) (discussing social mechanisms
by which party invitations to publications may be issued to traditional scholars but not
outsiders).
16. See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 543-45 (1988) (reporting that while
approximately half of tenured white law professors left a school because of retirement or death,
only one-fifth of tenured African American professors left a school for those reasons; noting also
that "twice as many black non-tenured professors moved to other schools before their tenure
decisions were made"); Valerie Fontaine, Progress Report: Women and People of Color in Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 30-31 (1995) ("Although
women have gained entry to the male bastion of legal academia, they remain clustered at the
bottom. Over 40% of clinical instructors and more than 70% of writing instructors are female,
making these the female ghettos of legal education. By contrast, rare is the woman who reaches
the top-the position of law school dean."); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Status of Women on
Law School Faculties: Recent Trends in Hiring, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 97-98 (using multiple
regression analysis to ascertain, among other things, that "minority men were hired at significantly more prestigious schools than were minority women with the same credentials and personal circumstances" and that "[w]omen were significantly more likely to start on the bottom
rung of the tenure-track ladder, as assistant professors"); Michael A. Olivas, The Education of
Latino Lawyers: An Essay on Crop Cultivation, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 117, 134 (1994)
(remarking that only one-third of all law schools have two or more minorities on the faculty);
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publishing, promotion and tenure committees may still keep in mind
criteria of meritocracy. 17 And if publication in a fancy review is determinative of merit, the feedback loop by which law review editors look
at the occupational ranking of an author-an instructor or an assistant, associate, or full professor-and the prestige of that author's
school and factor those credentials into a publication decision remains
18
unexplored.
Also, how will scholarship of outsiders be valued? One conclusion that could be drawn from the data is that outsiders are talking a
lot-but perhaps only to each other. 19 Are their ideas sifting into the
mainstream? We need measures other than quantitative criteria to
evaluate the theoretical influence of these scholars. Another political
dimension may be stratification: outsiders have broken into the inner
circle, but is there repetitive citation of a few key scholars of color? In
Professor Frances Olsen's three alternate visions of what these citation counts reflect, her least optimistic forecast envisions the wane of
affirmative action depriving the academy of additional outsider voices
accompanied by a possible devaluation of publishing at prestigious
law reviews precisely because outsiders are doing it.20 In short, if outsiders become insiders, will the meritocracy remain, but turn inside
out?
According to Professor Lindgren and Seltzer, "[t]he most striking
finding" of their computations "is that nineteen of the top twenty-five
individual publishers are lateral appointments."' l Does this say that
schools with money buy talent? Or that writing is a measure of ambition? And what kinds of scholarship will be valued if the principal
Carl Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143, 1145-46 (1990) (noting the
"dearth of tenured female faculty" and observing that women faculty may be relegated to lowerpaying, lower-status positions teaching legal writing: "[w]omen now occupy two-thirds of the
legal writing positions").
17. See Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like To Be Partof a Perpetual
First Wave or the Case of the DisappearingWomen, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799 (1988); Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
349 (1989); Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failureto Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67 (1994).
18. Judge Richard Posner argues that "law review editors generally lack the competence to
select and improve [nondoctrinal] scholarship." Richard A. Posner, The Future of the StudentEdited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1136 (1995). I am less concerned with student competence, and much more concerned with the subtle manifestations of bias, which can occur with
student or peer-reviewed journals, perhaps to even a greater extent with the latter.
19. Is there an "outsider" bias toward citing other "outsiders"? Does this up their citation

count?
20. Frances Olsen, Affirmative Action: Necessary But Not Sufficient, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
937, 937 (1996).
21. Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 7,at 805.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:947

measure of worth is repeated citation? Will this promote an institutional bias toward the general and away from sustained, detailed inquiry or empirical work? The data seem to yield questions, if not
answers, regarding the marketplace, rather than any insights into the
substantive qualities of what is being written.
Perhaps quantitative analysis simply asks the wrong questionsnot just in the dimension of relying on the popularity of a theory as
opposed to its explanatory or exploratory power, but perhaps the direction of quantitative inquiry is fundamentally wrong. We might
learn more about scholarship and the politics of the legal academy if
22
we explore instead what works are not being cited and why.
This Essay suggests that more useful insights can be gleaned from
exploring the substantive qualities of scholarship rather than the indicia of its popularity. Several theorists have suggested such qualitative
criteria instead of quantitative indicia for the evaluation of legal scholarship. Professor Mary Coombs, for example, sympathetic to the
plight of outsiders evaluated by the traditional criteria of merit, urges
outsider scholars to develop their own criteria of evaluation.2 3 She
also advises that critical race scholars and feminists focus on their au''24
dience and write "in a way that would appeal to decisionmakers.
The suggested focus on audience is still wedded to the criteria of meritocracy by accepting the current evaluative institutions and by promoting as one measure of worth how well an article appeals to those
who believe in traditional criteria of merit.
Beginning from a phenomenological standpoint, Professor Edward Rubin also has offered qualitative criteria by which to judge
scholarship. His recommended criteria are: significance (contributing
to the development of a field), applicability (possessing insights that
add to understanding), clarity (containing a clear statement of normative premises), and persuasiveness (convincingness, assuming the
22. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar,supra note 5, at 562-63 (describing somewhat incestuous citation patterns among white male scholars, who cite to each other but not to women
scholars or scholars of color).
23. Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO.L. REV.
683, 697, 706 (1992) (offering, among other standards, the uncontroversial suggestions that scholarship be "coherent, well-reasoned, articulate, and precise" as well as "analytic [and] tightly
reasoned"); see also Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV.
221, 222 (1988) (proposing a pluralistic approach to the evaluation of legal scholarship according
to the diverse purposes it may serve). But see Richard Delgado, Legal Scholarship: Insiders,
Outsiders, Editors, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 717, 723 (1992) (urging restraint in the development of

criteria for a nascent critical movement).
24. Coombs, supra note 23, at 707.
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reader accepts the normative structure).2 5 These criteria have aspects
of virtue, 26 but they seem ultimately less useful than the criteria of
27
rationality because they are more emotive and less clear.
The criteria I offer to distinguish cutting edge scholarship are not
comprehensive, nor must they all be present. Generally, the more that
apply to a piece or area of scholarship, the closer that work comes to
being at the innovative margins. These criteria are not connected to
prestige or authority or expertise of the established kinds. Thus, I am
not concerned with what is popular or fancy scholarship, but what is
powerful scholarship.
The criteria used herein to evaluate the innovative successes of
critical theories, particularly feminism, are criteria of rationality. 28
These criteria for theory-building are generally accepted in the sciences and social sciences. 29 The criteria include: the cumulative, comprehensive, and converging evidence of a theory's empirical basis;
explanatory power, depth or constructivity; fertility or exploratory
power; verifiability and falsifiability; social-technical power; and simplicity or elegance.
Cumulative, comprehensive, and converging evidence means evidence gathered over time, in variable contexts (including different disciplines and sub-disciplines), by various methodologies. 30 Deep
theories, those with explanatory power, postulate the relations, entities, and processes that undercut observable phenomena. That means
putting pieces of evidence together-relating theories to other theories. 31 A theory is fertile, or possesses exploratory power, if it gives
25. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80
CAL. L. REV. 889, 912-40 (1992).
26. While he discounts scientific rationality as a basis for understanding, Professor Rubin's
instrumental definition of significance, for example, points to some of the same qualities as those
embraced by the criteria of rationality. Id. at 928-35 (describing qualities of significance as acceptance and recognition, innovation, promoting advancement in a given field, and having fruitful effects on the development of other scholarship).
27. The criterion of persuasiveness, for instance, is subjectivisit; it does not tell what
grounds of persuasion should be valued. Similarly, how is clarity evaluated? By what criteria is
applicability determined?
28. See Nancy Levit, Listening To Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific
Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 267-72 (1989).
29. See, e.g., JAMES BOHMAN, NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: PROBLEMS OF INDETERMINACY 194 (1991); RICHARD S. RUDNER, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 7 (1966).
30. See, e.g., JEROME R. RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 209
(1973) (the "special character [of scientific knowledge] results from the complexity and interconnectedness of its materials, as they evolve through the complex and fallible social processes of
their use and adaptation").
31. See Michael Martin, How to Be a Good Philosopherof Science: A Plea for Empiricism
in Matters Methodological, in METHODOLOGY, METAPHYSICS AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 39
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rise to and searches for new relations and interdependencies. 32 Tied
to this is extensibility, which means that aspects of a theory live on as
33
new relations are found.
Theories must be capable of verification and falsification: "The
demand that, as a science progresses, its theories should become more
and more falsifiable, and consequently have more and more content
and be more and more informative, rules out modifications in theories
that are designed merely to protect a theory from a threatening falsification. ' 34 The social-technical power of a theory refers to its ability to
prevent, modify, invent, start, stop, interconnect, and transform. 35 It
is the practical, applicatory end of scientific and rational procedures.
Finally, simplicity or elegance refers to a theory being distinguished as
systematically unified and unifying, one which brings together the
general and the particular, and which is largely devoid of special circumstances. 36 None of these criteria is foundational nor more important than the others; they operate as a systemic whole.
As used here, "rational" focuses on the grounds, the criteria, for
evaluating arguments (the giving of reasons for conclusions). The
concern is with the social, personal, physical, and intellectual behaviors that seem to best justify or warrant conclusions, whether for particular claims or general theories. There is no one rationality, but the
criteria encompass the possibility of divergent rationalities, some
more or less evidentially warranted.
Why judge legal scholarship by these criteria? Why select these
criteria in lieu of audience appeal, persuasiveness, citation counts, or
other measures of demonstrated popularity? One method of justifica(Robert S. Cohen & Marx W. Wartofsky eds., 1984) (deep theories "go beyond the appearance
of things to their innermost structure").
32. See Eman McMullin, The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy, in HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES OF SCIENCE 12, 14 (Roger H. Steuwer ed., 1970).
33. See I. BERNARD COHEN, REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 395 (1985) (describing how the Copemican and Cartesian revolutions in knowledge influenced Newtonian thought); GARVIN MCCAIN & ERWIN M. SEGAL, THE GAME OF SCIENCE 50 (1988) (scientific explanations have
predictive abilities).
34. A.F. CHALMERS, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED SCIENCE? 51 (2d ed. 1982); see also
ARTHUR N. STRAHLER, UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS AND IS-

SUES 58 (1992) (scientific theories must be empirically falsifiable).
35. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 41 (describing revolutionary theories as those which "include conceptual changes of a fundamental kind, radical alterations in the standard or accepted
norm of explanation, new postulates or axioms, new forms of acceptable knowledge, and new
theories that embrace some or all of these features and others"); RUDNER, supra note 29, at 41
(discussing the power of a theory as manifested in its range of applications).
36. See RONALD N. GIERE, EXPLAINING SCIENCE: A COGNITIVE APPROACH 39 (1988); STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 9

(1988); RICHARD W. MILLER, FACT AND METHOD: EXPLANATION, CONFIRMATION AND REALITY INTHE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 252-62 (1987).
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tion for using these criteria is a comparison with other known evaluative methods. Constructivist positions, such as some critiques
premised on postmodernism, yield no criteria for knowing what is
worth retaining, and seem to insulate themselves from criticism by
adopting the self-protected posture of outsider looking in. 37 Evaluating scholarship to determine how well it comports with a particular
ideology is both a limited and intellectually frail method of assessing
scholarship, as is denouncing the worth of scholarship purely on the
basis of its ideological leanings. 38 The criteria offered by scholars such
as Professor Rubin move toward the evaluation of theory power and
significance, but they are less than precise.
The superiority of the criteria of rationality is that they can explain weaknesses or contradictions in other forms of argument. The
more general moral, rational, and empirical principles which ground,
explain, and justify claims should be of central concern. These criteria
can better align jurisprudential assumptions with rationally warranted
beliefs about evidence, decision-making, meanings, and values. To use
an analogy, the criteria move on a theoretical level, as the Supreme
Court moved on the doctrinal level in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,39 from a "general acceptance" theory for the verification
of knowledge to a scientific "reliability" test.
The justification for using the criteria of rationality does become
circular in part (the criteria are defended by the use of the criteria).
They include, though, a methodology for their own improvement and,
if necessary, abandonment. 40 However, the central and pervasive
theme of the criteria of rationality is the attitude of inquiry and openness fostered through their use. Socialized, the rational method is a
way of taking into account the continued interplay of experience and
methodology over time and space, context and disciplines.

37. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self- AutobiographicalPerformancesin Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
38. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiquesof Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745,
1778-87 (1989).
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

40. There have been modifications to the criteria of the scientific method over time, and a
general movement away from essentialism, foundationalism, grand requirements, and fixed be-

liefs as determinative of scientific merit. See generally THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
(Frederick Suppe ed., 1977). See also SCRUTINIZING SCIENCE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SCIENTIFIC
CHANGE (Arthur Donovan et a]. eds., 1988) (drawing on a variety of studies from history, crosscultural sociology, linguistics, and other disciplines, to examine how criteria of scientific or rational acceptability of scientific theories have changed).
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CUTTING EDGE CRITICAL THEORY

Innovation, of course, is essential to cutting edge work. New information and analysis, new ways of viewing problems, and new methodologies or explanations create intellectual progress. 41 But how do
we know which innovation is good innovation? The quest to say
something new may be a stretch, unsupported by evidence or by any
normative reason for the inquiry-with the thrust simply being to arrive at novelty. How do we distinguish cutting edge scholarship from
scholarship that is weird, strange, unusual, and faddish? We may not
be able to do that for many years until we take a retrospective look:
classic doctrinal analysis has been remarkably persistent; 42 rational actors models in economics and even newer models such as game theory
and public choice theory seem durable; 43 identity politics-the politics
of race, class, and gender-has produced trenchant and increasingly
respected scholarship. 44 But how can we figure out now what is sig45
nificant innovation?
The first substantive point about cutting edge work is that scholarship at the defining boundary relies foundationally on cumulative,
comprehensive, and converging evidence. This demonstrated empirical basis avoids reducing any theory to any particular arena of observations or sets of data. It promotes not only replication, but also
fertility (the conjoining of formerly isolated pockets of data, theories,
and experience). It encourages interconnectivity and extensibility,
i.e., portions of it live on in other theories; it leads to increasing and
diverse areas of theoretical and empirical relevance; and it may lead
41. See William E. Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 TEX. L. REV. 447,485-86 (1982) ("Occasionally... knowledge takes a large step forward. In science, those large steps are associated
with names like Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein; in legal history, with names like Maitland
and Hurst. All five of these scholars broke out of conventional modes of thought and pushed
the frontiers of knowledge well forward by creating new conventions of thought. They stood out
because they were extra ordinary; and they were extra ordinary because they rejected many of
the scholarly conventions of their time, did not ask commonplace questions, and did not ground
their work on widely held perspectives and analytical forms.").
42. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEo. L.J. 1, 14 (1986)
(asking rhetorically, "If law professors do not perform this social function [critical and skilled
evaluation of legal doctrine and legal institutions], who will do so?").
43. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); Ian Ayres,
Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
44. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship:Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 45; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited:
How To Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1992).
45. Of course, novelty alone is not enough. The very concept of innovation contemplates
not just nascency, but useful insights.
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to increasing systematization of theories or modifications of related
46
theories.
Umbilical to this is the second point, that evidence-to be truly
comprehensive-should come from other disciplines. There has been
a burst of awareness since the late nineteenth century that the activities of life-from physiological to psychological-are interconnected
and inter-influential. Interdisciplinary connections tie together seemingly unrelated areas, such as cosmology and quantum mechanics, 47 or
demographics, sociology, and the origins of crime. 48 Interdisciplinary
foundation for legal theory is essential; it allows a systematic and comprehensive look at human experience. 49 Law understood without this
50
foundation is law comprehended out of context.
A.

The Example of Feminism

I will use the vehicle of feminist theory to illustrate the first two
points about building the empirical foundation for scholarship and
about interdisciplinary work. Feminist legal theory has several differ46. See, e.g., Gerald Doppelt, Relativism and Recent Pragmatic Conceptions of Scientific
Rationality,in SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING 107, 141 (Nicholas Rescher ed.,
1983) (maintaining that "(partial) cumulativity, continuity, and unity ... seem[ ] essential to the
possibility of science as cognitive progress").
47.

See LEON M. LEDERMAN & DAVID N. SCHRAMM, FROM QUARKS TO THE COSMOS:

TooLs OF DISCOVERY 9 (1989) (indicating data collected from various astronomical phenomena,
such as explosions of stars and aberrations of light, can contribute to testing the predictions
made in quantum mechanics about the existence of a hundred or so postulated subatomic
particles).
48. It is not just social class, but differences between upper and lower classes, and class
unity and disunity; not mere poverty, but relative poverty; not just a particular attitude toward
crime, but a history and tradition of attitudes and community integration and disintegration that
is connected with the prevalence of crime. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993); Mark Kelman, The Origins of Crime
and Criminal Violence, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 214 (David Kairys
ed., 1982); Kirk R. Williams & Robert L. Flewelling, The Social Production of Criminal Homicide: A Comparative Study of Disaggregated Rates in American Cities, 53 AM. Soc. REV. 421
(1988).

49. In fact, my cynical view on hot topics is: look to see what is current in other disciplines
now and you can see what will be on the cutting edge in law fifteen years from now. Law has no
methodology of its own and is a notorious scavenger of other disciplines-not that that is a bad
thing; interdisciplinary work is a very good thing-it is just that we are so awfully slow about
doing it. See Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79, 91-92 (1987) (commenting on
the "lag time before the ideas from academic study permeate[ I the rest of society including
law").
50. See Phillip Areeda, Always a Borrower: Law and Other Disciplines, 1988 DUKE L.J.
1029, 1031. Law is not structurally set up to promote this interconnectivity. The reigning positivist model relegates inquiry in law to sets of rules as the principal locus of answers. Even on the
level of theory, Professor Jay Mootz observes that interdisciplinary explorations often begin and
end with capturing substantive support from other disciplines without using the knowledge in
either discipline to reconstruct disciplinary boundaries or re-examine a discipline's purposes or
methods of inquiry. Francis J. Mootz III, Desperately Seeking Science, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1009,
1010 (1995).
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ent principal strands or camps: equal treatment theory, difference theory, dominance theory, pragmatic feminism, and theories of feminist
essentialism. 51 But whether the goal of a particular feminist legal theorist is to promote equality 52 or skepticism about claims of foundational knowledge, 53 to acknowledge and emphasize differences
between men and women 54 or between women and women, 55 or to
fundamentally challenge the embedded, systemic, and structural conditions that promote the replication of patriarchy, 56 the schools of
feminist legal theory are united in one facet of their epistemological
approaches.
All three schools are reaching into other disciplines for methodological, theoretical, and empirical support. Equal treatment theorists, difference theorists, and dominance theorists have all searched
the historical record for evidence of the persistence of patriarchy
across time and cultures. In constructing arguments to redress inequities in prevailing wage laws, employment discrimination laws, sexual
harassment interpretations, child custody laws, and other areas, 57 feminist theorists in law have relied on innovations across disciplinary
51. See ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY
READINGS, PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 330 (1994).
52. The equal treatment theorists historically argued for equal wages, equal employment
opportunities, and equal social stature. They do compensatory scholarship-figuring out what
male scholarship leaves out and adding to it. This has been called the "add women and stir"
approach. See Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 67 (1985).
53. See Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1707
(1990) (noting that "[p]ragmatism and feminism largely share ... the commitment to finding
knowledge in the particulars of experience").
54. Cultural feminists or special treatment theorists, probably the predominant group of
feminist legal theorists, suggest that "women's voices ... emphasize positive values such as caring, nurturing, and empathy," and that women have special needs unshared by men due to their
biological roles as child-bearers and their social roles as primary child-raisers. Linda J. Lacey,
Introducing FeministJurisprudence:An Analysis of Oklahoma's Seduction Statute, 25 TULSA L.J.
775, 786 (1990).
55. Some critical race feminists and lesbian feminists have remarked on the dangers of
speaking and writing as if a "unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990);
see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-90); Maia Ettinger, Color Me Queer: An Aesthetic Challenge to Feminist
Essentialism, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 106 (1993).
56. The radical feminists, or dominance theorists, focus on the power relations between
men and women, and the pervasiveness of male social, political, economic, and sexual coercion
of women. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 40 (1987).
57. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED
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boundaries. For example, feminist legal theorists have studied literary
theory, which displays gender ideology packaged in the portrayals of
women in texts: "the ways in which women were represented, disempowered, forced into stereotypical molds, and punished for any reThey have also turned to: cultural
fusal to conform."'58
of patterns of men's and women's
examination
anthropology-the
typical behaviors, occupations, and roles; 59 sociolinguistics-the dis-

closure that women's tentative and deferential linguistic styles relate
to gender-linked issues of power and dominance; 60 economics-an evidential record regarding the subordination women face in various situations-from wage-earning 61 to car-buying, 62 from tort reforms that
will disparately impact damage awards to women 63 to post-divorce fi-

nancial hardships 64 to international exclusions from participation in a
country's economic life; 65 and sociology and developmental psychol-

58. Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnick, Convergences: Law, Literature & Feminism, 99
L.J. 1913, 1934 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, CulturalEvidence and Male Violence: Are Feministand Multicultural Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1995).
60. Professors of sociolinguistics on different continents have documented gendered patterns of dominance and subordination in discourse: while males often speak authoritatively and
controllingly, females tend to speak submissively and hesitantly. JULIA KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN
LANGUAGE: A SEMIoTIC APPROACH TO LITERATURE AND ART (1980); ROBIN T. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975). Those of you who are professors or students probably
recognize that female students often raise their hands tentatively in class; male studentswhether it results from testosterone or millennia of social teaching-will raise their hands assertively. Women often apologize for their answers, and perhaps for their very existence, before
giving arguments-"I don't know if this is what you are looking for... "or "I'm not sure if this
"
is right ....
61. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 34 (1995);
Robert H. Cohen, Note, Pay Equity: A Child of the 80s Grows Up, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461,
1462 n.16 (1995) ("The astonishing numbers continue: individually, women lose over $420,000
during their lifetime due to pay equity; on an annual basis, the collective loss due to wage discrimination against women is over $100 billion; among college graduates, white men earned
approximately $9,000 more in 1992 than did men of color, and approximately $13,000 more than
their female colleagues.").
62. See Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Genderand Race Discriminationin Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV.817 (1991); Ian Ayres, FurtherEvidence of Discriminationin New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 109 (1995).
63. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that since women are more likely to receive noneconomic damages in medical products liability litigation than men, proposals for tort reforms
will disproportionately impact women).
YALE

64. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY
OF DIVORCE REFORM 4 (1991); Karen C. Holden & Pamela J.Smock, The Economic Costs of
Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a DisproportionateCost?, 17 ANN. REV. SoC. 51

(1991).
65. See Adrien K. Wing & Eunice P. de Carvalho, Black South African Women: Toward
Equal Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1995).
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ogy-the increasing documentation regarding the social construction
66
of gender roles.
The empirical and epistemological bases of feminism span numerous disciplines. 67 In drawing on economic data, public opinion polls,
social and biological evidence, literary theory, behavioral research,
and tests of hypotheses about the formation of ideological beliefs,
feminist legal theory relies foundationally on cumulative, comprehensive, and converging evidence. What gives the feminist critique its
power is how the findings from other disciplines accumulate-how
they build on each other; 68 how they are comprehensive-how they
encompass the situations of women from the vantage points of psychology, sociology, history, literature, and anthropology; 69 and how
they converge-how they point toward central propositions about
subordination.
A third criterion of cutting edge scholarship is that innovative
legal theories will be fertile theories; they will lead to explanatory and
exploratory spin-offs. Implicated by the demands that evidence supporting theories be cumulative, comprehensive, and converging, is the
continuing search for new relations and interconnectivities. 70 Exploratory theories are those which begin to develop alternative explanations of related pockets of data, see that simplistic, reductionistic
causes are inadequate, and keep central open and continuing inquiry.
Again to draw from the example of feminism-feminist legal theory has not remained statically in the realm of theory. Scholars have
66. For example, Arlie Hochschild studies the gendering of housework. Her research
reveals that even women who work outside the home disproportionately shoulder the
housework:
Adding together the time it takes to do a paid job and to do housework and childcare, I
averaged estimates from the major studies on time use done in the 1960s and 1970s, and
discovered that women worked roughly fifteen hours longer each week than men.
Over a year, they worked an extra month of twenty-four hours days. Over a dozen
years, it was an extra year of twenty-four hour days....
ARLIE R. HocHscHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT. WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 3-4, 8 (1989).
67. See, e.g., KATHRYN PYNE ADDELSON, IMPURE THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY,
FEMINISM, AND ETHICS (1991); BETWEEN FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS (Teresa Brennan ed.,
1989); DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY (1985); DIANA H. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLmCAL THEORY: FROM ANCIENT MISOGYNY TO CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM (1993);
FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (Judith Evans et al. eds., 1986); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING,
MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (1992); FEMINISM AND
METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL SCIENCE ISSUES (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).

68. See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of FeministJurisprudence:An Essay, 95 YALE
L.J. 1373 (1986) (tracing the development of feminist theory in law from roots in philosophy,

educational psychology, and psychoanalytic theory).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
70. See PAUL HUMPHREYS, THE CHANCES OF EXPLANATION: CAUSAL EXPLANATION IN
THE SOCIAL, MEDICAL, AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES

140-41 (1989).
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branched out and explored its applications to the environmental justice area,7 1 to clinical teaching, 72 and to lawyering. 73 Feminist juris-

prudence has transformed law in important ways. It has, for example,
impelled evidentiary changes in the way rape prosecutions are han-

74
dled and generated the enactment of laws against sexual harassment.

Recent inquiries have expanded on the premise that gender can be
disempowering by exploring the intersections between gender and sex
and sexual orientation 75 and by applying feminist theory to situations
in which sexual stereotyping harms men. 76
A fourth and related criterion of good theory-building is depth or

constructivity. Deep theories posit connections and relations that
help explain facts; they construct explanations that go beyond the
facts. 77 Feminist legal theory was parented in part by critical legal
studies, and its growth was encouraged by connections to other theories, such as critical race theory. 78 It has also fleshed itself out theo-

retically by turning inward to explore its own methodologies and
assumptions. 79 The fertility of feminism is evidenced by some recent
cross-disciplinary ventures. Some scholars have begun using the as-

71. See, e.g., Robert R. Verchick, In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental
Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 23 (1996); Robert F. Housman, The Muted Voice: The Role of
Women in Sustainable Development, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 361 (1992).

72. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991).
73. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992); Ruth
Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990).

74. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1647, 1651 (1993).
75. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregationof Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
76. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence,105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Nancy Levit,
Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037
(1996).
77. See Levit, supra note 28, at 269 ("A deep thesis goes beyond merely stating or describing phenomena. It explains possible causal relationships among observable phenomena, arranges isolated events into general patterns and seeks underlying explanations."). Evolutionary
theory, for instance, is a deep theory in that while no one has seen biological evolution occur,
scientists have used principles from geology, anatomy, embryology, physiology, and biochemistry, and have documented the fossil record and protein analysis to support the thesis. The theory
of evolution explains these adaptations and relations. See, e.g., CHRIs McGOWAN, IN THE BEGINNING: A SCIENTIST SHOWS WHY THE CREATIoNIsTs ARE WRONG (1984).

78. See, e.g., Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to
the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1995).
79. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829 (1990).
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sumptions of feminist theory to reshape other theories of
jurisprudence.8 0
There are a number of ways in which feminist legal scholarship
has used the interpenetration of disciplines to lead to fertile or extensible theories. As an example, the social sciences and humanities have
had a powerful impact on laws and legal theories. Linguistic philosophy, for instance, has influenced how we speak about crimes. For
years, incidents of "domestic violence" went unprosecuted. That was
family violence-a personal affair, something not to be intruded into.
Now we speak of "battered" spouses-battery, that's a real crime,
something deserving of prosecution. 8 ' As another example, research
on feminine styles of interpersonal interaction has spurred forms of
dispute resolution in law such as mediation and negotiation that are
alternatives to the traditional trial and adversarial models.8 2 And
there are countless other ways in which fertile and deep theories can
change and shape legal rules.
This moves to the last defining criterion of cutting edge scholarship. Cutting edge scholarship also tries to strengthen social inquiry.
This is a very general characteristic which stems from the other criteria of rationality. Theories which have explanatory and exploratory
power will couple that fertility and extensibility with cooperative interdisciplinary work. The epistemological goal of promoting social inquiry is not just cognitive, it is also attitudinal and evaluative. 83 This
requires the diminution of strident, ideological partisanship and persuasion, and greater efforts to empathize, to treat others with consideration and justice, and to find grounds and means for rationally living
together-all of which would sponsor equality of opportunity, justice,
peace, and reasonableness in the larger society.
One significant way in which promising theories strengthen inquiry is by recognizing the implicit values they promote and by assuring that those embedded values also comport with the criteria of
80. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, The Role of Law and Economics in Feminist Legal Theory,
paper read at AALS Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, Jan. 5, 1996 (using feminist theory to
inform the behavioral assumptions of law and economics).
81. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993).
82. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985).

83. See DONALD T. CAMPBELL, METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE
293-95 (1988) (explaining that an experimenting society will have an ideological commitment to
exploratory innovation, accountability, decentralization, and nondogmatized approaches); Levit,
supra note 28, at 272-74 (suggesting that the criteria of rationality imply certain values, such as
openness, non-chauvinism, and a lack of prejudice or prejudgment).
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rationality. For example, theories such as feminism and critical race
theory, which are premised on a lack of prejudgment, an absence of
exclusionary categories, nourish inquiry by their openness. Another
way in which more powerful theories address and promote social inquiry is by insisting that both laws and theories accurately depict the
human condition. 84
Cutting edge theories seem to have an eye on social change as
well. Work at the exploratory margins not only focuses on new ways
in which we can inform society and reshape it, but seems to try to
convince people to move in ways that make a better society-that
promote either compassion or understanding, preferably both, or perhaps some other valuable social objective. Innovative work often
strengthens social inquiry by encouraging the approach of social issues
with a legal solution or legal issues with a social solution. Finally, inquiry into inquiry, with no absolute principles or foreordained, unchangeable ends, is the lifeblood of rationality.
B.

Using the Criteria of Rationality to Move in New Directions

Throughout this essay, I have used the vehicle of feminist legal
theory as an example of cutting edge work, as defined by the criteria
of rationafity. This should not suggest that feminism alone is at the
innovative margins of theory, quite the contrary. Critical race theory
is another compelling example of a modern jurisprudential movement
that relies strongly on cumulative, comprehensive, and convergent evidence and theories. Culling support for its central proposition of the
subordination of racial minorities from history, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, and law, 85 critical race theory is developing into a fertile, deep, and extensible theory. Its theorists have explored the
many ways in which race infects the criminal justice process; 86 introduced-with essentialist critiques, intersectionality analysis, and reasoning "from the bottom up"-perspectival approaches into analytic
84. See, e.g., Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally
Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1255 (1990) (urging that the legal presumptions concerning mentally retarded parents take into consideration how the personhood of those individuals is socially constructed).
85. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observationson Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1994); Lucie E. White, Introduction: Thirty Years in America's Cities: Lots of Movement,
Not Much Justice, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293 (1995).
86. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301
(1995); Symposium on Race and CriminalJustice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1994).
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jurisprudence; 87 and promoted and theoretically grounded a narrative
movement that has fundamentally changed jurisprudential
88
discourse.
One might, in reading this essay, question whether the criteria of
rationality are simply being used as a way of gaining some legitimacy
for modern critical movements. Does feminism fare well under these
criteria because it is cutting edge or because the deck has been
stacked in its favor? If any theory of evaluation is principled, it will
not be of a particular ideological hue. An example of this is how law

and economics, as well as contemporary critical theories, increasingly
satisfies the criteria of rationality.
First, law and economics is moving away from a closed theoretical
model, with some theorists altering the assumptions of classical
89
microeconomics so that the models more closely mirror reality.
With the refinement of its analytical tools, it is becoming an increasingly fertile and extensible theory. Given the development of public
choice theory and game theory, law and economics has been applied
to various forms of collective action. 90 Its methods permeate wide-

ranging areas of law-from antitrust and torts to corporations and
criminal law; 91 and its insights are enriching other areas of legal theory
and schools of jurisprudence. 92
Law and economics is also gaining depth as some of its adherents

move in ways that promote cooperative social inquiry. Some legal
economists are altering the underlying assumptions of the model, de87. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersectionof Race and Sex: A Black
FeministCritique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Harris, supra note 55; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
88. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT

AMERICA AND RACE (1995); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving
Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79
IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994); Lawyers as Storytellers and Storytellers as Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REV. 565
(1994).
89. See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics,
74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 224-25 (1995) (explaining how post-Chicago law and economists acknowledge market imperfections and urge regulators to consider opportunistic behavior regarding
market failures in determining whether to intervene).
90. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 43; Linda S. Beres, Games Civil Contemnors Play, 18 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 795 (1995); Farber & Frickey, supra note 43; Douglas R. Williams, Valuing
Natural Environments:Compensation, Market Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 365 (1995).
91. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20-22 (3d ed. 1986).

92. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531 (1995)
(using economic literature about strategic behavior to explore the formation of seemingly ineffable qualities such as trust and cooperation).
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pending on its contextual application. For instance, in the area of collective bargaining, the strategic behavior identified by Professor
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt does not reflect traditional law and economics
assumptions of cost-free, rational bargaining or a universal commitment to wealth maximization. 93 In short, law and economics scholars
are using converging, contextual data to reconstruct their economic
94
models to comport with rationality.
Another test of a theory is its predictive validity. How well do
the criteria of rationality predict what will be on the cutting edge of
legal theory in a few years or even decades? Take, as an example,
chaos theory. Very generally, chaos theory is the idea that in nonlinear systems, there are patterns of predictability in otherwise seemingly random events. 95 Only recently have theorists recognized the
application of chaos and complexity theory in the non-linear system
that is law. Yet, as Andrew Hayes notes, "jurisprudence, both conventional and other, has responded to chaos theory with a collective
'so what?'" 96
While not validated by the traditional measures of theory popularity, chaos theory possesses the possibilities to invigorate both doctrinal analysis and jurisprudence. Although based on models from
mathematics and the hard sciences, chaos theory is increasingly finding a home in a variety of other disciplines. 97 Recently, chaos theory
has begun to offer fertile contributions to legal theory. Professor
Lawrence Cunningham argues that performance of financial markets
over time should not be mapped as simply random walks, but instead
may exhibit hidden patterns of order and predictability that "can ac93. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A BargainingAnalysis of American Labor Law and the
Search for BargainingEquity and IndustrialPeace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 420-23, 512-13 (1992).
94. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to RationalActors: A
Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989). Of course, it may be
argued that law and economics offers a weak example of how theory-building should proceed,
since some empirical examinations of its underlying assumptions appear to be generated in an
effort to protect the assumptions. See Robert C. Downs, Law and Economics: Nexus of Science
and Belief, 27 PAC. L.J. 1, 26-27, 35 (1995).
95. See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); M. MITCHELL
WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992).
96. Andrew W. Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751, 751
(1992).
97. See, e.g., WILLIAM BERGQUIST, THE POSTMODERN ORGANIZATION: MASTERING THE
ART OF IRREVERSIBLE CHANGE (1993); SALLY J. GOERNER, CHAOS AND THE EVOLVING ECOLOGICAL UNIVERSE (1994); DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, POSTMODERN LAW AND DISORDER: PSYCHOANALYTIC SEMIOTICS, CHAOS AND JURIDIC EXEGESIS (1992); EDGAR E. PETERS, CHAOS
AND ORDER IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: A

NEW VIEW OF CYCLES, PRICES, AND MARKET VOLA-

TILITY (1991); IAN STEWART, DOES GOD PLAY DICE? THE MATHEMATICS OF CHAOS (1989); L.

Douglas Kiel, Nonequilibrium Theory and Its Implications for Public Administration, 49 PUB.
(1989).
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count for market crashes" and provide better rationales "for such basic corporate and securities law doctrines as mandatory disclosure
rules and mandatory fiduciary obligation[s]. ' 98 Other legal theorists
have tapped the complexity notion of a "butterfly effect" (minor
changes in initial conditions can have enormous outcome consequences) to suggest new areas of inquiry in litigation:
Applying chaos theory's non-linear approach to law, one might say
that just as a butterfly's wing flutter in China may produce a hurricane in Florida, so, too, a defendant's inappropriate smile in the
course of a criminal trial might generate the cognitive armature
around which jurors weave a story of guilt.99
Although it is unfleshed at present, scholars can see that there might
be a fractal dimension in law.
Chaos theory is a good example of the argument that we should
divorce theory popularity-chaos theory has not permeated legal inquiry-from theory significance. Chaos theory is multidisciplinary in
its origins and applications, examining changes over time and space
and systems, and bringing to the study of change in a localized system
diverse data from other fields. It is in line with other theories which
move away from unicausal explanations and from predictability or
regularity as a main sign of reason; it unites the particular and the
general. By following changes beyond their usual disciplinary patterns, chaos theory and complexity theory may someday tell us a great
deal about law and about life. In short, chaos theory is an example of
a theory presently lacking on the popularity scale, but offering a
promising avenue of potentially significant and powerful theory.
III.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Any theory should be falsifiable, and must be tested for validity
with the consideration of alternative, competing hypotheses. It may
be suggested that what entrenched feminist legal theory, or indeed, all
critical theories, was not just the cumulative presence of these criteria
of scientific persuasiveness. Demographics may provide an explanation for what the academy perceives as compelling scholarship. One
of the unmistakable messages of legal realism was that the social and
98. Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 546, 551 (1994).
99. Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681,
695 n.57 (1994); see also Anthony D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 192-93 (1990).
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political positions of scholars may play a role in determining what theories certain groups of people find acceptable and interesting.
For instance, one might argue that critical theories were both
prompted and sustained by the wave of women and racial minorities
graduating from law school in the 1970s. These nontraditional lawyers
became disenchanted by institutions and involved in social action
projects. 100 In increasing numbers, they entered the legal academy,10'
thus providing a fertile pool of scholars receptive to the social
messages of critical theory. And perhaps, unlike feminist theory and
critical race theory, which spoke to legions of oppressed women and
people of color, chaos theorists do not have the same receptive audience of scientifically trained, prospective protegees, waiting for an
epiphany of theory.
This explanation, however, again confuses the popularity of a theory with its theoretical power. A theorist applying the criteria of rationality would not dispute that the social circumstances of theorists
might influence their intellectual directions. A central thesis of this
essay, however, is that popularity is not one with validity. 102 What
gave the critical movements their power and credence was their substantive base of support.
It is certainly true that natural law theories, creationism, capitalism, Marxism, feminism, Einsteinian relativity theory, and all other
theories have been influenced greatly by changing interests and needs
of human, technological, and social forces. But, especially over time,
the intellectually grounded and promising elements in our theories
can be distinguished from the narrower and ideological elements eschewing inquiry criteria in favor of pure personal experience or group
identity. Rational studies of inquiry necessarily cross boundariespolitical, ideological, racial, departmental, and institutional. Our abilities to rationally evaluate flurries, forays, or fads of thought in any
area expand as we bring together historical, cross-cultural, and comparative studies over the wide range of human interactions with physical, biological, social, and psychological data and theories.

100. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986).
101. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal
Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School", 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988).
102. The geocentric theory of the universe held sway for centuries. Hitler was adored and
followed by entire nations.
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CONCLUSION

This essay has attempted to raise questions about the traditional
criteria of merit.1 0 3 It argues for greater attention to the foundational
qualities of theory-building, in the hopes of promoting research and
inquiry in promising directions. It is vitally important not only to
identify those conditions and ideas that improve legal theory, but also
to ascertain the criteria and mechanisms of improvement. Understanding why theories are strong and full of potential will encourage
further contributions to the understanding of legal theory and legal
practice. This should assist in building better jurisprudential thinking.
This essay argues for more universal standards that place a premium on innovation, rationality, and social consciousness. The standards of sound and rounded reasoning, of adequate evidence and
intellectual procedure, provide touchstones for evaluating theoretical
merit. These criteria of rationality hold promise to create an arena of
democracy for scholarship as well as to encourage innovation and spur
productive inquiry.

103. For a critique of the concept of meritocracy, see ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., SMART PEOPLE: THE My-nHs OF BIOLOGY, MERIT, AND EQUALITY UNDER LAW (New York Univ. Press
forthcoming 1997).

